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OF BOROUGHS, BOUNDARIES AND
BULLWINKLES*: THE LIMITATIONS OF




At least once every decade, Congress, and state and local govern-
ments, go through a ritual known as redistricting. So it was with the
New York City Council in 1991. Ostensibly, this districting was dif-
ferent from other council districtings, because of a substantial increase
in the size of the council and the possibility of diminished incumbent
influence on the appointed commission directing the process. More-
over, the commission received its mandate from a reform oriented
Charter Revision Commission, which had been appointed in response
to federal court litigation with broad authority to restructure city gov-
ernment consistent with the Constitution and the provisions of the
Voting Rights Act. There was much that was different, but there was
much, perhaps too much, that was the same.
This essay examines the 1991 city council districting, with particu-
lar focus on the problems inherent in districting a multiracial city and
the limitations of single member districts as a method of minority em-
powerment. This essay is based on the experience of the writer as
general counsel to the 1990 New York City Districting Commission
and the ideas articulated by Professor Lani Guinier, of the University
of Pennsylvania law school, in a recently published article.'
A central tenet of that article is that "a new conceptual approach is
necessary to structure majoritarian collective decision-making bodies
to ensure meaningful minority interest representation and participa-
tion at both the electoral and legislative stages of the political pro-
* The press so dubbed a proposed Bronx district after the cartoon character
Bullwinkle the moose, because the shape of the district resembled a pair of antlers. See
Frank Lombardi, Dist. 17 Plan Hit, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 18, 1991, at 5.
** Associate Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc.; General
Counsel to the New York City Districting Commission, Sept. 1990 to Sept. 1991. I am
grateful to Lani Guinier for the considerable time she spent discussing issues and com-
menting on drafts. I also thank Joseph Diaz for his editorial and research assistance.
1. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats]. While I cite extensively to this
excellent and thought-provoking article, I strongly urge readers to take the time to read it
thoroughly.
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cess. "2 One such approach, which would shift the question from
whether racial and ethnic minority groups per se are represented to
whether the interests of those groups are represented, is Professor
Guinier's proposal that in some circumstances single-member dis-
tricts should be replaced by at-large election districts whose dilutive
effects3 would be mitigated by the use of cumulative or limited vot-
ing.4 The use of single-member districts, Professor Guinier argues,
may result in minority electoral success, but not minority power.5
Presumably, minority empowerment was a fundamental goal of the
Charter Revision Commission. The Districting Commission was to
accomplish this goal by drawing districts that increased minority rep-
resentation on the enlarged council. Other objectives included: (1)
increasing political participation by the use of smaller geographic dis-
tricts to enhance representational effectiveness, premised on the idea
that small districts mobilize voter participation; (2) increasing identifi-
cation of the voter with the elected representative; and (3) better de-
fining neighborhood boundaries and thus improving representation of
communities of interest.6
Part II of this essay provides background on the council districting
process and discusses the New York City Council's 1991 redistricting
plan. Part III examines specific council districts that demonstrate the
drawbacks in using a single-member scheme in districts that contain
more than one minority group. The essay concludes that electing
council members from at-large, borough-wide districts by cumulative
voting is a more effective districting strategy.
2. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1416.
3. Vote dilution occurs when "election laws or practices ... combine with system-
atic bloc voting among an identifiable group to diminish the voting strength of at least
one other group." Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINOR-
ITY VOTE DILUTION 4 (Chandler Davidson, Joint Center for Political Studies, eds.,
1984).
4. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1427 n.49.
5. Guinier distinguishes between the right to cast an equally weighted vote, see
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 531, 579 (1964), and the right to cast an equally powerful
vote, which conveys an equal opportunity to influence the political process at all levels.
Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1422-24, 1441 n. 105. While the former leads to
the election of black officials, it is the latter that holds the potential for full participation
of the electorate. Black electoral success without more may leave in place an "integrated
legislature in which white majority rule in its self-interest is legitimate so long as some
black representatives are there when the majority acts." Id. at 1415.
6. See Douglas Muzzio & Tim Thompkins, On the Size of the City Council: Finding
the Mean, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 90-93 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin,
Academy of Political Science eds., 1989) (discussing the eight core values identified by
the Charter Revision Commission).
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II. The Districting Process
A. The City Council and Districting Commission
The city council is the legislative body for the five counties, or bor-
oughs, of New York City. Its members are elected from single-mem-
ber districts to serve four-year terms, with elections being held in odd-
numbered years to coincide with mayoral elections.7 Up until 1989,
the council was considered generally an ineffective branch of the New
York City local government. That picture is expected to change in
light of the expanded size and greater authority of the council that
resulted from a major revision to the New York City Charter. Thus,
the first districting of this newly empowered council - expanded in
size from thirty-five to fifty-one members - was bound to assume an
importance surpassing prior redistrictings.
In response to Board of Estimate v. Morris,8 the revision to the city
charter included a provision to abolish the board of estimate and
transfer its functions to other governmental institutions.9 The Char-
ter Revision Commission ("Schwarz Commission") ° chaired by
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, a former corporation counsel to the city,
decided that most of the board's powers should be transferred to the
fifty-one seat city council, as a democratically elected body with
greater potential for reflecting a racially diverse population. The in-
crease in the number of districts from thirty-five to fifty-one meant a
reduction in district size from an average of 212,000 to an average of
143,579. Not only was the city council itself changed in size and
scope, but the independent commission charged with council district-
ing was increased in size from nine persons to fifteen. To ensure a
minority presence on the districting commission, the charter required
that its membership reflect the racial and ethnic composition of the
7. CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Ch. 2, §§ 4, 25 (as amended Dec. 31,
1989) [hereinafter CHARTER].
8. 489 U.S. 688 (1989). The Supreme Court held that the voting structure of the
board of estimate violated the constitutional principle of one person, one vote. The board
of estimate, whose members were the mayor, city council president, comptroller and the
five borough presidents, shared legislative power with the council in the budget process
and had certain land use and franchise authority. 489 U.S. at 694 n.4. The three city-
wide elected officials had two votes each and each borough president had one vote. Thus
the least populous and the most populous borough had one vote.
9. SUBMISSION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT FOR
PRECLEARANCE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 16
(Aug. 11, 1989) [hereinafter CHARTER SUBMISSION] (on file at the New York Municipal
Library, 55 Chambers St., New York, NY, 10007)
10. The Schwarz Commission assumed the work of an earlier Charter Revision Com-
mission, the Ravitch Commission, named for its chair Richard Ravitch, the former head
of the New York City Transit Authority.
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city. " As a result of this provision eight of the commissioners were
members of racial and language minorities: four African-Americans,
three Latinos and one Asian-American. Finally, the new charter
made specific reference to the Voting Rights Act in listing criteria for
the line drawing, 2 and it provided for a special city council election to
be held in 1991.
B. Drawing the District Lines
With these guidelines in hand, the commission began its work in
the spring of 1990. A driving force for the commission's work was
compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.' 3 Sec-
tion 2 of this Act forbids the use of voting practices or procedures that
result in discrimination on the basis of race or language minority sta-
tus. A governmental entity may be in violation of this section where
aggrieved parties can show "that the political processes ... are not
equally open to participation by members of [racial and language mi-
nority groups] in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice." 4
11. Section 50(b)(1) of the charter required that the commission be composed of
"members of the racial and language minority groups of New York City which are pro-
tected by the [Voting Rights Act of 1965], in proportion, as close as practicable, to their
population in the city." The Justice Department, while noting that the provision might
be "vulnerable to constitutional challenge," precleared it, concluding that "the flexible
goal as adopted serves a legitimate remedial purpose ... in recognition of the need to
insure that a broad cross-section of the electorate will participate in ...[the] council
districting." Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, New York City Charter Revision Commission 4
(Dec. 13, 1989). This requirement drew a lawsuit which is still pending, challenging the
provision as unconstitutional. See Ravitch v. City of New York, No. 90 Civ. 5752 (MJL).
12. Reference to the Voting Rights Act appeared in the charter for the first time and
was accorded greater weight than all other factors except for the requirement of one
person, one vote. Other criteria (for example, community and neighborhood integrity,
compactness and borough integrity) were given less weight than fair and effective repre-
sentation of minorities. CHARTER, supra note 7, § 52.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C § 1973(b). In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the Court set
forth the elements of proving a violation under § 2 in the context of a challenge to multi-
member districts. The Court held that plaintiffs must show the existence of three precon-
ditions. First, plaintiffs must show that a minority group is "sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." Second,
there must be a showing that the minority group is politically cohesive. Third, there
must be a showing that the "white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ...
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." 478 U.S. at 50-51. A district court
considering such a claim is to make a searching practical evaluation of the past and pres-
ent reality to determine whether the political processes are equally open to minority
groups. Id. at 45. The outcome depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 42
U.S.C. § 1973.
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In light of New York City's history of discrimination in voting
rights, the commission staff operated under the premise that where a
minority district" could be created it must be created. This assump-
tion derived from at least two sources: (1) the commission's interpre-
tation of both the Voting Rights Act' 6 and the Justice Department's
position that districting plans "fairly reflect minority voting
strength;"' 7 and (2) the charter's requirement that districts be drawn
in a manner that provides "fair and effective representation to groups
protected by the Voting Rights Act,"'" premised on the Charter Revi-
sion Commission's stated goal that representation of minority groups
be maximized.' 9
To determine where such minority districts could be drawn, the
commission's technical staff performed a detailed analysis of census
data to identify geographical clusters of the various minority popula-
tions. Depending on the proximity of minority residents, lines could
be drawn to "capture" a sufficient proportion of minority residents.2°
15. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the commis-
sion defined a "minority district."
16. The Court in Gingles declined to state whether the standards applicable to a chal-
lenge to a multimember system would be relevant to a challenge to a single-member
system. 478 U.S. at 46 n. 12. At least one court has suggested that Gingles could be
adapted to the single-member district context, by requiring plaintiffs to show that addi-
tional single-member districts could have been drawn. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp.
196, 205 (E.D. Ark. 1989). However, the Jeffers court's determination that existence of
the Gingles factors alone is not sufficient to make out a violation, Id. at 209, led it to find
no § 2 violation in one of the challenged counties, based on the district court's assessment
that other factors justified the failure to draw additional minority district. Id. at 215-17.
17. The Supreme Court has held that the sufficiency of representation may turn on
whether a districting system "fairly reflects the strength of the [protected group] as it
exists" and whether a "fairly designed" plan affords "representation reasonably
equivalent to [the minority group's] political strength in the ... community." City of
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1975). This standard is echoed in the
letter objecting to the 1981 New York council redistricting, where the Justice Depart-
ment noted that the "[w]hile the city is under no obligation to maximize minority voting
strength, [it is required to] demonstrate that the plan 'fairly reflects the strength of the
[minority] voting power as it exists.' " Objection letter from U.S. Justice Dep't, at 2 (Oct.
27, 1981) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
18. CHARTER, supra note 7, § 52.l.b.
19. CHARTER SUBMISSION, supra note 9, at 22.
20. Reference to "the sixty-five percent rule" is often seen in voting rights literature.
See, e.g., Kimball Brace et al., Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory
and Practice, 10 LAW & POLICY 43 (1988). This is a reference to the presumed need for a
minority district to contain 65% majority, in order to be able to elect a candidate of the
minority community's choice. See Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985). This figure is arrived at by adding 15% to a 50% plus
one majority, to take into account the relative youth of the minority population (5%), as
well as its lower registration rate (5%) and attendance at the polls, or turnout rate (5%).
740 F.2d at 1415-16.
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The commission also received input from groups that were monitor-
ing the process, such as NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
(PRLDEF), Asian-American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(AALDEF), the Community Service Society and the Latino District-
ing Committee.
In June 1991, the commission submitted its districting plan to the
Justice Department for review. 2 While the plan met the section five
retrogression standard,22 the Department nonetheless rejected the
plan, based on its view that Latino interests had not been fairly repre-
sented.23 On July 26, 1991, a plan slightly revised to accommodate
the Justice Department's concerns was precleared.
C. Charter Revision: The Road Not Taken
As stated above, the Schwarz Commission abolished the board of
estimate and transferred its powers to the city council. During the
commission's deliberations, an alternative to abolition considered was
the creation of a bicameral legislative body consisting of an expanded
city council and a body comprised of borough presidents and others
selected on the basis of borough population. The commission also
examined the use of cumulative or limited voting systems to elect the
additional members.
In a cumulative voting system, a voter has as many votes as there
are seats and may cast those votes as the voter wishes: the voter may
either split her votes, allocating one or fewer votes for each candidate,
or "cumulate" all her votes for a single candidate, a tactic referred to
21. SUBMISSION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT FOR
PRECLEARANCE OF 1991 REDISTRICTING PLAN FOR NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL (June
17, 1991) [hereinafter REDISTRICTING SUBMISSION] (on file at the New York Municipal
Library, 55 Chambers St., New York, NY, 10007).
Three counties in New York, Kings (Brooklyn), New York (Manhattan) and the
Bronx are "covered" under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, because of the past use of
literacy tests and because voter turnout in the 1968 presidential election was less than
50%, the statute's "triggering formula" for coverage. See United Jewish Orgs. of Wil-
liamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 148-49 (1977) (setting forth New York City's failed
attempt to be exempted from coverage); New York v. United States, 429 U.S. 888 (1974)
(affirming district court order directing compliance with § 5 of the Act). Such jurisdic-
tions must obtain prior approval ("preclearance") from the Justice Department before
use of an electoral practice not in effect at the time the jurisdiction became covered. 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (1990).
22. 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(a). Under this standard, the party seeking preclearance must
show that any electoral change, such as a redistricting, does not make minorities worse
off than they were before the change, i.e., a prior districting plan.
23. See Letter from John Dunne, Asst. Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Judith Reed,
General Counsel, New York City Districting Commission, at 2-3 (July 19, 1991).
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as "plumping."24 In a limited vote system the voter has fewer votes
than the number of seats. 25 A principal advantage of these alternative
systems is that they "eliminate the winner-take-all feature of at-large
elections in order to empower politically cohesive minority voters. 26
Neither system guarantees that the majority will not be able to con-
sistently out-vote a numerical minority, but the goal is to make it pos-
sible for the latter to cast meaningful votes, provided the parties and
the voters engage in some strategic planning.27 Moreover, voters get
to express the intensity of their preferences as well as their political
cohesion.28
While consideration was given to these alternative methods for
electing the proposed bicameral legislature, apparently little or no at-
tention was given to changing council districts from single-member to
some form of at-large districts with cumulative or limited voting.29
Although there is no record of any discussion of this alternative, it is
likely that had the Schwarz Commission contemplated this scenario,
it would have rejected it for the reasons given by the Schwarz Com-
mission for rejecting the use of these alternatives for a modified board
of estimate. "Major impediments .. .were seen [to be] the over-
whelming size of the electoral districts involved, ranging from 1.2 to
2.2 million people, the cost of running for office in such large districts,
the different nature of political communication and voter coordina-
tion in such large, impersonal districts, and the complexity of New
York State's election laws and practices."3
This skepticism ignores the historical fact that city council mem-
bers in the past have been elected in a variety of ways, including the
use of some at-large districts and proportional representation to en-
sure representation of third party groups. Between 1937 and 1945,
council members were selected not from individual districts, but
24. See Edward Still, Alternatives to Single Member Districts, in MINORITY VOTE DI-
LUTION 249 (Chandler Davidson, Joint Center for Political Studies ed., 1984); Guinier,
No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1427 n.48.
25. See Still, supra note 24, at 253.
26. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1427.
27. Still, supra note 24, at 253-58.
28. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1427 n.48.
29. Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compact-
ness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 178 (1989)
(noting that the "innate appeal of the geographic approach lies in large part in its
familiarity").
30. Frank J. Mauro, Voting Rights and the Board of Estimate: The Emergence of an
Issue, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE
OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 66-67 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin, Academy of Polit-
ical Science eds., 1989).
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based on the proportion of total boroughwide votes3" won by candi-
dates and parties. Notwithstanding that history, the chair, Frederick
A. 0. Schwarz, has stated that "a proportional representation system
produce[s] a good debating society [but not] a good legislature,
[which] requires coherence." 2 Others point out that the former pro-
portional representation system achieved not only geographic balance
but also the ethnic diversity encouraged by the Voting Rights Act.3
The Schwarz Commission's revisions meant continued use of "ge-
ography as a proxy" for various interest groups.3 4 The problem with
such an approach is that while it takes advantage of racial segregation
to create some minority-controlled districts, it places roadblocks in
the way of minority empowerment. Guinier argues that the single-
member districting strategy depresses minority political organization
and participation and fails to promote the interests of voters. A geog-
raphy-based districting scheme, Guinier further argues, favors incum-
bents who distort the districting process by seeking packed districts
and who are then free to pursue their own agenda.35 This strategy has
31. Marvin Gottlieb, The 'Golden Age' of the City Council, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1991, § 4, at 6. One form of alternative voting, the "single-transferrable vote," is still in
use in New York City school board elections. Id. Under this method the voter ranks
candidates in order of preference, and candidates are then eliminated on successive ballot
counts, by the "transfer" of votes from the losing candidates. Still, supra note 24, at 258-
63.
32. Gottlieb, supra note 31, at 6.
33. Henry Stern, Numbers vs. Neighborhoods, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 3, 1991, at 42
(New York Forum) (noting that historically the offices of mayor, comptroller and council
president have been divided among Jews, Italians and Irish).
34. "[Gleography can serve as a proxy for a bundle of distinct political interests,"
since the residential segregation of ethnic minority groups "is often a product of racial
discrimination in both the private and public housing markets.... [and] residence often
reflects socioeconomic status and interests." Karlan, supra note 29, at 177.
35. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1449, 1451, 1454-55. Since the 1982
redistricting, only one council incumbent has lost an election. Such perpetuation not
only discourages participation of voters (which in turn assists the incumbent who is bene-
fited by low turnout) and challengers who see a campaign effort as futile, but also limits
accountability. Id. at 1455-56, 1465.
Incumbents expended considerable energy in trying to influence the commission. The
clearest example of incumbent protection occurred in Brooklyn and, although the incum-
bent being protected was Latino, this appropriately drew an objection from the Justice
Department. The Justice Department found that the plan resulted in overconcentration
of Brooklyn's Hispanic voters in the 34th council district at the expense of Hispanic
voters in the neighboring district, number 37. Letter from John Dunne, supra note 23, at
2-3. In another area of the city, supporters of African-American incumbent council
member C. Virginia Fields protested that the district did not contain a sufficient percent-
age of African-Americans. Finally, the line-drawing in district 45 resulted in a lawsuit
from the white incumbent who sought to be placed in that district, which contained por-
tions of her former district. Other districts demonstrated visually the influence of incum-
bents or other politicians. See Jerry Gray, Creating New City Council Districts: Minority
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two other drawbacks of particular relevance here. First, minority
groups who may be politically cohesive but residentially dispersed36
are apt to remain unrepresented.37 Second, reliance on geography
also may exacerbate conflict among minority groups, setting up what
may be called a "political land grab."38 These last two flaws were
perfectly exemplified in the 1991 council districting.
D. The November 1991 Election Results
The Schwarz Commission predicted that the fifty-one member city
council taking office in 1991 would boast at least eighteen minority
members, representing a twofold increase from the nine who sat on
the thirty-five member council; As it turned out, the number of mi-
norities actually elected exceeded this estimate, and of the twenty-one
minority members, the number of African-Americans on the council
doubled and the number of Latino members tripled. 39 Not only is the
council more ethnically diverse, but there are five Republican mem-
bers up from one, and two openly gay members. One of the commis-
sion's vice-chairs, while noting that she was not "happy with
everything [in the plan or] ... with some of the things that happened
... [viewed] this plan [as] the best plan that has ever come out of a
Districting Commission."'
From the Schwarz Commission's perspective, the districting com-
mission's plan effectuated at least the first two of the stated goals,
which were the following:
(1) to enhance opportunities for minority voters to elect candidates
of their choice, (2) to increase the number of minority council
Concerns vs. Incumbency, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1991, at B3 (describing the "Miller fin-
ger", a reference to alteration of Brooklyn district 44, to include the residence of Assem-
bly speaker Mel Miller.) Staten Island district 49 showed a distinct outcropping to
include the incumbent's residence, and lines in Manhattan districts 4 and 5 on the Upper
East Side excluded the residences of two previous challengers to a Vallone supporter and
incumbent, Robert Dryfoos. Id.
36. Where this is true, "districting does not create a close fit between interests and
residence." Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1452.
37. A dispersed minority group is simply unable to elect a candidate of its choice,
absent the ability to form coalitions with other residents of the district.
38. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1453.
39. The 12 black members represents an increase from six, while the nine Latinos
represents an increase from three. Alternative counts are 13 black and eight Latino rep-
resentatives, with the discrepancy attributable to how one "counts" new council member,
Adam Clayton Powell IV, whose father, the well-known late Congressman, was black
and whose mother is Puerto Rican. Powell was elected from a predominantly Latino
district.
40. Comments of Esmeralda Simmons, Vice-Chair, New York City Districting Com-
mission (June 3, 1991).
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members, (3) to maintain a council of manageable size in which all
members can meaningfully participate and (4) to increase council
members' responsiveness by making their constituencies smaller,
without making those constituencies so small as to foster
parochialism. 4
From the perspective of this writer, only the second goal was fully
realized, while the first and most important goal was only partially
realized. Whether the remaining two goals will be achieved remains
to be seen.4 2
While the plan was a facial success,4 3 neither this diversity, once
thought likely to lead to a more independent body, nor the greatly
enhanced power of the council, viewed as likely to attract more quali-
fied members, has had the anticipated results. Also open to question
is whether the formation of minority coalitions to formulate and work
toward implementing a collective agenda of minority concerns will
occur." The new council sworn in on January 8, 1992, is still consid-
ered to consist of middle-of-the-road Democrats who are loyal to the
entrenched Speaker, Peter Vallone, and his allies.45 It is possible that
41. CHARTER SUBMISSION, supra note 9, at 18.
42. Sam Roberts, New York's City Council Field: Fresh Faces, Traditional Mold, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at Al (quoting a council political consultant as predicting that a
"major transformation.., in terms of experience or point of view or the kinds of interests
represented" was unlikely). Roberts notes that eight of 32 former council members were
running unopposed and that the process has "inspired ... relatively few political neo-
phytes." Another newspaper story described the results in pessimistic but accurate
terms:
It is one thing ... to see that the complexion of the Council changes ... it is
quite another to ensure that those changes will give voice to the voiceless .... A
more diverse council may ease white liberal guilt, but it is hardly a guarantee of
better representation for the city's poor and disenfranchised.
Terry Golway, Bespoke Redistricting, N.Y. OBSERVER, June 17, 1991, at 5.
43. This is not to denigrate the value of a racially diverse legislative body. See
Karlan, supra note 29, at 213-19; Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting
Rights Act and The Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991)
[hereinafter Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism]. Both authors discuss the symbolic and
actual value of representatives who have shared the experience of minority groups, who
are particularly sensitive to the views of that community, and whose presence both pro-
vides a sense of legitimacy, which may encourage minority participation, and puts these
representatives in a position to take action on behalf of the communities they represent.
44. Una Clarke, the council's first Caribbean woman member, argues that "[w]ith
twenty-one of us in the Black and Latino Caucus, we're forty percent of the council and
should be able to come up with a common agenda." Can She Fight The Power?, VILLAGE
VOICE, Feb. 4, 1992, at 13.
45. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Vallone Seeks Broader Role on Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1992, at B I. Reelected council speaker Peter Vallone, who has represented a
Queens council district for many years and has served as speaker since 1986, has been
described by the New York Times as "an old-school democrat [who] still runs a one man
show that allows for.little dissent or creativity .... reward[ing] loyalty with committee
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these problems, and the districting difficulties discussed in the next
section, are attributable, at least in part, to the Charter Revision Com-
mission's failure to seriously consider alternatives such as cumulative
voting for the election of the council, perhaps because its goals, while
laudable, did not include that of minority interest representation. Nor
did that commission focus on whether minority districts actually em-
power minority voters, as opposed to minority candidates. Achieving
minority empowerment would require providing a vehicle for voters
with common interests to express their preferences and elect repre-
sentatives of their choice, regardless of where they lived.46
III. Inter-Minority Conflict
Unlike previous redistrictings, where plan drafters were accused of
fragmenting minority populations to favor white interests,47 the most
challenging issue faced by this commission was to resolve competing
claims of three significant minority groups: African-Americans, Lati-
nos and Asian-Americans. Where populations of different minority
groups were highly commingled, very hard choices had to be made.
This conflict was inevitable in light of the dispersal of the Latino and
Asian populations and the limitation of the single-member district
strategy.
A. The Numbers
New York City of 1990 had changed dramatically from the city of
1980. The intervening decade had seen an influx of African-Ameri-
can, Latino and Asian populations. According to the 1990 census
chairmanships and other perquisites, punish[ing] dissent and dodg[ing] reform." Wel-
come, Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, at A22.
46. Some hearing testimony suggested that interest politics or "borough nationalism"
might transcend racial concerns, even in the current racially charged environment and in
a city where ethnic politics has long held sway. In the Bronx, for example, residents of
Co-op City, a multi-building, racially integrated, housing complex, testified that they
wanted to be wholly contained in one district and expressly stated that they were uncon-
cerned as to whether that single district was a minority or non-minority district. With
regard to a proposed link of Latino communities in Brooklyn and Queens, both Latino
and non-Latino witnesses from Queens (which would have been the smallest part of the
bi-borough district) testified that they preferred to remain part of a Queens district. How-
ever, contrary testimony regarding a proposed combined Staten Island-Coney Island dis-
trict that would have linked African-Americans living on the North Shore of Staten
Island with those living in a section of Coney Island in Brooklyn split squarely along
racial lines. Felicia R. Lee, On S.I., Whites Like Plan A, but Blacks Like B, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1991, at B3.
47. See, e.g., The Shape of New York's Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1991, at 26
(citing as one example of intentional discrimination the drawing of a district to remove
enough minority voters to permit white voters to control a neighboring district).
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data, African-Americans make up twenty-five percent of New
Yorkers, while twenty-four percent are Latinos and seven percent are
Asian. 48 Together, these three minority groups make up a majority of
both the city's total population (fifty-six percent) and the voting age
citizen population (fifty-two percent: twenty-three percent African-
Americans, twenty-two percent Latino and seven percent Asian-
Americans).49
One thing that had not changed however, was that residential pat-
terns remained segregated, albeit at differing degrees for each of the
three major minority groups.50 A geographically based districting ap-
proach takes advantage of such residential segregation,51 although not
without cost. As a result of differing population dispersal rates, while
the city's Latino and African-American populations are roughly equal
(1.7 million and 1.8 million, respectively), it was much more difficult
to draw districts in which Latinos predominate. The contrast be-
tween this difficulty and the relative ease with which the commission
could draw African-American districts led to accusations that Afri-
can-American and white commissioners "conspired" to favor Afri-
can-Americans at the expense of the Latino population.52 The
necessary focus on race and capturing minority populations in general
led to cries of racial polarization and balkanization.53
48. See CHARTER SUBMISSION, supra note 9, at Appendix I (Report of 1990 Census
Population Distributions and Densities).
49. Id.
50. African-Americans and whites are significantly more segregated than Asian-
Americans and Latinos. In general, African-Americans and whites tend to live the far-
thest apart with Latinos tending to live immediately adjacent to African-Americans, and
Asian-Americans tending to live adjacent to Latinos on one side and whites on the other.
The commission found, for example, that while 69% of the city's African-Americans live
in voter tabulation districts (the smallest geographical unit representing whole census
blocks and tracts, as well as whole election districts, or precincts) in which they comprise
at least 50% of the total VTD (voter tabulation district) population, only 48% of the
city's Latinos reside in such VTDs.
51. As one commentator has noted, "[g]iven residential segregation and a significant
minority-group population, a geographically based districting scheme is likely to produce
some districts in which the electorate is composed primarily of minority-group members.
In those predominantly minority districts, minority-group votes can elect candidates re-
sponsive to their needs. Karlan, supra note 29, at 177.
52. See Wayne Barrett, Mapmaker, Mapmaker, Make Me a Map: How the Beastly
Politics of Redistricting Pits Minorities Against One Another, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 6,
1991, at 11, 12 (criticizing claim as a "conspiracy without a purpose" and noting that in
some districts it appeared that Latino groups "prefer losing a seat to a white than to a
black").
53. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1453; Karlan, supra note 29, at 236 (not-
ing that redistricting in single-member district context may exacerbate focus on racial
politics); Martin Gottlieb, New York's Democratic Experiment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1991, at 18 (discussing the issue as one of "balkanization" or "healthy sharing of
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The question of where one could draw minority districts dissolved
naturally into a sub-issue of how much greater than a simple majority
in a district was needed in order to achieve effective minority voting
equality with whites.5" The commission did not operate pursuant to a
specific rule of thumb. However, it was aware that historically only
those districts with eighty percent combined minority population (and
where there was at least sixty percent of a single minority) elected
minority council members. Where minority population concentra-
tions permitted, the commission sought districts with a clear numeri-
cal preponderance of one or another of the protected groups.
In the first elections held under the 1982 redistricting, members of
minority groups were elected to the council only from each of the nine
districts with minority populations of eighty percent or more." These
districts also shared two other characteristics. First, they contained a
clear preponderance of a given minority group; second, the white pop-
ulation was under twenty percent. The 1982 results showed that
when minority groups were competitive and there was more than one
minority candidate, each minority group tended to cancel the voting
effectiveness of the other.5 6 Moreover, when white voting strength
approaches thirty percent, as it did for those three districts which, in
1982, had combined minority populations of between sixty-nine and
seventy-two percent, lower rates of registration and turnout for racial
and language minority groups mean that the white population con-
trols the outcome of the election. These factors led the commission to
try to lower white population and to increase minority percentages in
the minority districts.
In order to further maximize minority electoral opportunities, the
commission examined voting age population and registration rates by
race in addition to total population data." The estimated voter regis-
power"); Sam Roberts, Redistributing Oddities Reflect Racial and Ethnic Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1991, at BI. "Racial and ethnic politics is a New York tradition, but the
latest redistricting appears to codify it as never before and to redefine community." Id.
54. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Achieving effective voting equality
means looking beyond total population to determine what level of minority group is
needed in light of history, voting patterns and registration rates.
55. See REDISTRICTING SUBMISSION, supra note 21, at Exhibit 10.
56. Former districts 6, 8 and 25 each elected non-minority council members. Each of
these districts had white populations ranging from 25 to 27%. REDISTRICTING SUBMIS-
SION, supra note 21, at Exhibit 10. One of these districts, 8, had no minority group as a
majority (the African-American and Hispanic percentages were 31% and 42%, respec-
tively), while the other two districts, numbers 6 and 25, are believed to have high rates of
noncitizens. Thus, in 1982, in an East Harlem-South Bronx district, a white candidate
prevailed in a three-way contest involving two other Latino candidates.
57. Since the board of elections does not maintain a listing of voters by race, the
commission used a surname analysis to estimate numbers of Latino and Asian-American
1992]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
tration data was a critical component of the creation of districts in
geographical areas where no single minority group was dominant.
Such areas came to be known within the commission as "hot spots;"
indeed, the struggle between minority groups, long denied significant
influence in the governance of the city, was one of the distinguishing
features of the 1991 districting. This inter-ethnic conflict surfaced
most prominently in three areas of the city: the Lower East Side of
Manhattan, District 8 in East Harlem and District 21 in Queens.
B. The Lower East Side of Manhattan
1. The Districting Conflict
The districting of the Lower East Side of Manhattan is the most
interesting and instructive. The Lower East Side is a neighborhood
whose boundaries are well-defined and whose community has tradi-
tionally consisted of different racial and ethnic immigrant groups.
Demographic analysis showed that the city's Latino population was
more dispersed than the African-American population, and that the
Asian-American population was the most dispersed of the three
groups.58 The problem with the creation of a minority district on the
Lower East Side was essentially one of population: no matter how the
commission drew a district, neither an Asian majority nor a Latino
majority district could be created. Hence two alternatives emerged.
First, the commission could draw two separate districts, one in which
Latinos would be a plurality, and one in which Asians would have an
"influence." 59 This involved placing the Asian-American population
voters, and from those results to arrive at estimates of white and black voters, by election
district. Subgroups within the major racial/ethnic groups in New York City tend to have
differing rates of citizenship. Thus, while Puerto Ricans are citizens, other Latino sub-
groups such as Dominican, Honduran, Costa Rican, Colombian, Salvadoran, etc., are
likely to have a large number of non-citizens. In addition, the number of persons under
18 years of age varies significantly among some subgroups in the same racial/ethnic cate-
gory. These factors made clear that for some minority groups it would be necessary that
such a group be much more than 65% of the population of a district, supra note 20, in
order for such a group to have an opportunity to elect a candidate of its choice. See, e.g.,
Latino Political Action Comm. v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting
that more than one minority group and insufficient cohesion may necessitate a higher
percentage).
58. See REDISTRICTING SUBMISSION, supra note 21, at Appendix I (Report of 1990
Census Population Distributions and Densities).
59. An influence district is one containing "a significant minority population but not
enough to exert electoral control." Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1452 n. 146.
In such a district the presumption is that a minority group will exercise influence by
becoming a "swing vote" that a candidate must woo. Id. at 1468 n.199. The concept
may be an illusory one wherein racially polarized voting exists, supra note 14, and inter-
racial coalitions are absent or not reciprocal. Id.
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concentration in the Chinatown areas with whites rather than with
Latinos. Such a district would have had thirty-three percent Asian,
and fourteen percent Latino voting age populations.' Second, the
commission could draw one "multi-ethnic" district,6" in which Latino
and Asian-American populations would be combined. This issue was
the subject of considerable testimony and disagreement, as both the
Asian and Latino communities sought different solutions.
A majority of the Latino community, as well as both PRLDEF and
AALDEF, favored the multi-ethnic alternative.6 2 This might have re-
sulted in a district with thirty-eight percent Asian, thirty-two percent
Hispanic, thirteen and one-half percent African-American and sixteen
percent non-minority total population, for a combined minority total
of eighty-three and one-half percent.63 In examining this alternative,
the commission tried to ascertain whether there was political cohe-
sion" among these groups. There was some evidence of cohesion and
successful coalition-building around interests, and some indication
that Latino voters were willing to support Asian-American candi-
dates, although little indication that the converse was true.65
The Asian groups were divided. Some argued that it would be un-
fair to make them compete with the Latino electorate to elect a candi-
date of choice. These groups also argued that a separate district
offered a better chance to elect an Asian candidate. On the other
hand, PRLDEF, AALDEF and other individuals countered that: (1)
60. See REDISTRICTING SUBMISSION, supra note 21, at Exhibit 17. (Redistricting
Commission's Initial Plan).
61. The considered options were a district connecting the community of Chinatown
with either the Hispanic sections of the Lower East Side to its North ("multi-ethnic") or
with the essentially non-minority area to its west (the Financial District and Battery Park
City), parts of "Little Italy" and some of the "Soho" area (an East to West district).
Although the commission discussed the first option, it never released publicly a map that
showed a combined district, except for pre-census receipt drafts, known as "scenarios."
62. The Community Service Society (CSS), an advocate primarily for the African-
American community, also supported a combined district.
63. Data provided to Redistricting Commission by Lower East Siders for a Multi-
Racial District, at 10.
64. Political cohesion may be shown where minority groups vote together or work
together on issues. Compare Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3213 (1989) (finding cohesion between African-Americans and
Latinos where they voted together for minority candidate), with Romero v. City of Po-
mona, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989) (failing to find cohesion where majority of blacks
supported white opponents of Latino candidates, and majority of Latinos supported
white opponents of black candidates).
65. Ideally, one would examine contests involving white and minority candidates to
see whether the two minority groups coalesced behind a single candidate. Campos, 840
F.2d at 1245. Of course, there were few elections, primarily low-salience judicial and
school board elections where turnout was low, where Asian and Latino candidates ran
and such an analysis could be performed.
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a multiethnic district would better serve minority interests, since it
would be more likely to produce a minority council member, or at
least a member who would be sensitive to the needs of the commu-
nity; (2) the Asian population was growing North, not West; and (3)
the Lower East Side population was socioeconomically different from
that of Battery Park, with common interests such as real estate devel-
opment, of considerable importance in an era of gentrification and
lack of affordable housing. The opposing factions were intensely di-
vided, accusing each other of presenting plans that were candidate
driven.
Certain members of the commission apparently were persuaded by
the "separate-but-equal" geographical approach. Moreover, the com-
mission concluded that, because of the low registration rates of both
Latinos and Asian-Americans, in the absence of convincing evidence
of significant cohesion between the two groups, non-Latino white vot-
ers in a multi-ethnic district could control the outcome of an election.
In addition, there was some concern that the Latino community
would predominate over the Asian-American community, because the
registration rates for Asian-Americans are even lower than those of
Latinos due to citizenship, recency of immigration and other
barriers.66
The commission finally decided to pursue a course that would best
further Asian empowerment in the city, so it decided to create two
separate "minority districts." It considered various political realities,
including the fact that Hispanic voters could consistently outvote an
Asian preferred candidate if the two communities were pitted against
each other, and the fact that Asians, with at least seven percent of the
city's population, could be left with little political representation. The
commission - although not in unanimity - resolved that the best
method to proceed by would be to "cordon off" the Hispanic and the
Asian communities and to create an Asian "influence" district, in
which whites, rather than Latinos, would retain electoral control
based on registration rates.67
The decision to create two "minority districts" had several negative
consequences: (1) it "wasted" votes of the Latino community; (2) it
66. See generally S. Sun Bai, Affirmative Pursuit of Political Equality for Asian Pacific
Americans.- Reclaiming the Voting Rights Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1991).
67. Of the total population in this district, 37% is non-minority, 6% is African-
American, 17% is Latino and 39% is Asian-American. However, at the estimated regis-
tration level Asian-Americans are only 14% of the district while whites are 61.5% Ironi-
cally, there was a greater percentage of Latino registered voters (15.5%) than Asian-
American (14%) in this so-called Asian district. See REDISTRICTING SUBMISSION, supra
note 21, at Exhibit 15.
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was criticized by Latino groups and some Asian groups; (3) it frac-
tured communities of interest and in so doing prevented the opportu-
nity for coalition-building;68 (4) it put pressure on the size of other
Manhattan districts, because to concentrate Asian voters, the district
was set at the smallest allowable size;69 and (5) it was unrealistic in an
expectation that an Asian candidate might be elected.
The second alternative, a multi-ethnic district, would have reflected
the traditional multi-ethnic composition of a distinct neighborhood,
keeping a socioeconomically similar community intact. The election
results belie the notion that the commission had created a district
where Asian-Americans could elect a candidate of their choice: no
Asian candidate was elected, despite the fact that two Asian-Ameri-
can candidates ran, one of whom, Margaret Chin, outspent her oppo-
nents by a considerable margin. 0 Instead, not surprisingly, a white
candidate was elected by non-Asian voters.71 The neighboring district
68. Asians and Latinos have worked on issues important to both groups, such as
affordable housing, health care, immigration services and bilingual education. Margaret
Fung, A District Like A Mosaic, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 12, 1991, at 68. See also Will
They Draw a Credible Map?, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 31, 1991, at 52 (criticizing the joining
of "a mostly Chinese portion of the Lower East Side to a mostly white, yuppie district to
the south and west" preventing the creation of a "district that could elect a minority
council member to address its shared socioeconomic concerns"). The commission's
choice also meant that neighboring district 2 Latinos were linked to affluent Grammercy
Park residents to the North.
69. An application of the one person, one vote rule, with a permissible 10% deviation
from the average population, meant that districts could range in size from 137,930 to
151,938. CHARTER, supra note 7, § 52a. 1. Once the decision was made to create a lower
Manhattan district of 137,930 persons, most of the remaining Manhattan districts were
over 151,000. The large size of those districts meant that Manhattan had "fewer repre-
sentatives per capita than any other borough." Bob Fitch, Mauling the Mosaic: Redis-
tricting Was Meant to Boost Minorities. It Ended up Preserving White Power, VILLAGE
VOICE, June 18, 1991, at 12. More importantly this result deprived other minority
groups in Manhattan of the benefit of small districts, and deprived the commission of
flexibility that would have been useful when, because of a Justice Department objection,
the commission had to redraw district 8 in El Barrio. In attempting to avoid a "ripple
effect" that might have delayed the election, the commission was severely constricted in
the changes that could be made to this district.
70. According to statements filed by all candidates who received public financing,
Chin spent a total of $196,565, while Fred Teng and Kathryn Freed, the other two candi-
dates, each spent $113,708 and $147,554, respectively. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE REPORTS 3:
EXPENDITURES (on file with the New York City Campaign Finance Board, 40 Rector
Street, New York, NY, 10006).
71. Kathryn Freed, the white Democratic candidate received 5,717 votes, while Mar-
garet Chin, on the Liberal line, won 2,853 votes, and Republican Asian-American candi-
date Fred Teng received 2,630 votes. 1991 NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF ELECTIONS
ANNUAL REPORT. An Asian-American candidate who was victorious in a district con-
trolled by affluent white voters might well have fallen victim to conflicting loyalties. Cf
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 43, at nn. 155, 157, 196 and accompany-
ing text (where blacks are elected by white voters they may experience tactical campaign
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produced a Latino council member who was elected with considerable
white support.
Given the negative consequences of the commission's decision and
the extensive testimony in favor of a multi-ethnic district, it is fair to
ask on what basis a majority of the commission made its decision.72
The option chosen was the preference of the one Asian-American
commissioner and one of the Latino commissioners, while African-
American commissioners were prepared to support either option.
The multi-ethnic alternative was preferred by two of the three Latino
commissioners.73 The majority of the commissioners were persuaded,
ultimately, by the strongly expressed views of its sole Asian-American
member and by the fact that in a geographically based districting
scheme there was no area other than lower Manhattan where Asian-
Americans might exercise any influence,74 while there were other op-
portunities to create districts where Latinos could elect candidates of
choice or exercise influence.
2. Borough- Wide Districts and the Cumulative Voting Option
Let us now examine what could have resulted had the commission
not been restrained by the single-member districting strategy. Under
an alternative system, with a council consisting of fifty-one seats, the
members would be elected not from single-member districts, but, as
Professor Guinier postulates, from at-large borough-wide districts
whose voters would vote cumulatively. The population of Manhattan
meant that it was entitled to ten districts. Under an at-large plan not
bound by geography,7 in which cumulative voting was used, each
voter residing anywhere in Manhattan would have ten votes which
difficulties, lose their ability to advocate for the minority community, and there is a dan-
ger that triumph loses some of its community value).
72. Although these commissioners "descriptively represented their respective minor-
ity groups, as appointed rather than elected representatives, their status as 'authentic'
community-based representatives was not established." See Guinier, The Triumph of
Tokenism, supra note 43, at 1102-09 (defining authentic representation based on impor-
tance of community connections and electoral ratification). Descriptive representation is
representation by culturally and physically similar persons. Id. at 1102 n. 114.
73. Commissioner Chin evidently disdained the notion that common interests should
play a role in districting decisions, stating to a reporter that the commission was not
"empowered to carry on the class struggle." See Fitch, supra note 69. One commissioner
privately expressed a disinclination to "ghettoize poor people."
74. It was clear that although there are about a half of a million Asian-Americans in
the city, or seven percent of the total population, their distribution was such that there
would likely not be a single district in which Asian-American voters could exercise a
strong influence in determining which candidate should serve in the council.
75. Moreover, "[i]f geography fails to define completely the minority group interests,
it also pigeonholes whites as well." Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1475.
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could be cast as he or she wished. Regardless of whether one Asian
out of ten Manhattan council members was elected, the votes of the
Asian-American community would have counted as much as the
votes of any other community.
The results would have depended less on individual commissioners,
whose advocacy seems to have been a greater determinant than the
voice of the public, and more on views of the public affected.76 There
is no evidence that an individual commissioner, appointed by the
mayor, is a more authentic representative of the Asian-American
community than others.77 Although the revised charter listed several
criteria,78 neither it nor any other source provides standards for
resolving conflicts between minority groups.79
These conflicts would be considerably lessened under cumulative
voting, which "fosters minority representation without directly "sin-
gling out" some minority groups.80 Cumulative voting allows voters
to form coalitions81 with other residents of a given borough to, in ef-
fect, create their own districts:
This electoral ability is totally independent of the geographic com-
pactness of the group; even if its members are randomly scattered
throughout the jurisdiction, they will be able to join together at
election time. In essence, then, this [alternative voting scheme] al-
lows the creation of "voluntary," nongeographic single-member
districts within the jurisdiction. 2
Given the dispersal of the fastest growing ethnic group in the country,
76. Indeed, the commission's deputy counsel, Joseph Diaz, was so convinced that the
public had indicated a preference for a lower Manhattan district that combined Latinos
of the lower east side and Asians of Chinatown, that after one public hearing dedicated
primarily to district 1, he mused: "Well, we know what the public wants, I wonder how
the commissioners will respond?"
77. The "authentic" minority leader may be thought of as one who is actually elected
by the minority community and not one who is handpicked by the "establishment."
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 43, at 1103.
78. See supra note 12.
79. Guiner, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1453. See also Jerry Gray, New Prize in
Districting Tug-of-War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at B3 (quoting Esmerelda Simmons,
Vice-Chair, Districting Commission, who commented that division of power is not easy
"particularly when people are losing power and others are gaining power and the ques-
tion is who gets what when). See also Jack Newfield, Hidden Agendas Ruled, Council
Gerrymandered, N.Y. OBSERVER, June 24, 1991, at 10 (accusing commission of a
"double standard" for being willing to "bend and stretch lines to create potentially gay
and Asian districts" but refusing to do the same for Latinos).
80. Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J.
144, 155 (1982).
81. One reason for this may be that cumulative voting "rewards cooperative, rather
than competitive, behavior." Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1464.
82. Karlan, supra note 29, at 226.
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Latinos, and the hoped-for demise of residential segregation, voters
should be "allowed to support candidates of their choice without wor-
rying which side of a line they were living on." 3 The commission
would have been spared months of debate in a futile attempt to deter-
mine whether the Asian community was "better off" with whites in
Battery Park or Latinos on the Lower East Side.84 Instead, the voters
would have answered that question themselves.8 "
C. "El Barrio" and Queens
In East Harlem ("El Barrio") and in District 21 in Queens, the
commission had to decide how to accommodate Latino and African-
American interests. The census indicated that the traditional Latino
area of "El Barrio" (District 8) had by 1990 become nearly fifty per-
cent African-American, and that Latinos had become more dispersed.
The commission, deciding that the predominant population of this
district should be Latino rather than either African-American or
white, chose to draw a district that enhanced the electoral opportuni-
ties for the Latino population. 6 To increase Latino potential, how-
ever, the commission had to remove areas that were overwhemingly
nonminority and had to unite areas of the South Bronx and Manhat-
tan Valley.
In Queens, the question for the commission was whether to draw
District 21 with a majority Latino population but with African-Amer-
icans as the largest registered group, or to draw a "nominally" Latino
district that would really be dominated by whites because of low La-
tino registration rates. The commission chose the former alternative.
In both District 8 and District 21, some Latino groups argued for
inclusion in a majority white district as a "swing vote," rather than in
83. Gottlieb, supra note 31 (quoting Henry Stem).
84. Karlan notes that "[o]ne of the central debates in voting rights law has been, at
least ostensibly, over the means of assuring black civic inclusion: are blacks better off
controlling completely the electoral fortunes of a few representatives or are they better off
influencing the electoral prospects of a larger number of candidates?" Karlan, supra note
29, at 213; See Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1458 (arguing that such a dichot-
omy is a false one, since "[t]he single-member district model ... presupposes an unre-
sponsive decision-making body and then builds in appropriately limited alternatives,
without ever defining what 'better off' means").
85. See Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 1, at 1461-63 (emphasis added) (describing
advantage of election method that recognizes voluntary interest constituency in which
voters "identify themselves with each other based on their own evaluation of their
interest").
86. This district, with 22% African-Americans, 51% Latinos and 13% Asian-Ameri-
cans, has a combined total minority population of 76%. African-Americans and Latinos
were a majority of the registered voters, at 44% and 22%, respectively. REDISTRICTING
SUBMISSION, supra note 21, at Exhibit 15.
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a "minority district," where Latinos and African-Americans would
have to compete. Under the single-member district strategy, the com-
mission chose to create "minority districts," which it felt would maxi-
mize the liklihood that minority voters would be able to choose a
candidate of their choice.87
The dispersal of identifiable population groups should not be
viewed as a detriment, but as an asset, as an indication that our soci-
ety is moving beyond rigid residential segregation. And yet in Dis-
tricts 8 and 21, the dispersal of the Latino population raised the
decibel level of interminority dispute. The single-member district
strategy forced the commission to ask a very unappealing question: is
a geographically-dispersed minority "better off" with white voters,
who may or may not have any sympathy for Latino interests, or with
other minority groups, with whom there is the presumption of de-
structive competition?
The use of a cumulative voting strategy would have provided a way
for dispersed Latino communities to make common cause with any
sympathethic group found in the particular borough. However, in
1991, instead of the districting process being used to heal rifts, it
served to widen them in these areas.
IV. Conclusion
This essay has explored the issue of whether it is possible to con-
struct districts under a single-member district system in a manner
that actually empowers minority communities and their interests - as
opposed to simply electing more minorities - where those minority
communities are either highly commingled or too dispersed to form a
majority in a district. Using the recent New York City Council dis-
tricting as an example, I have attempted a practical application of
Professor Guinier's theories concerning the use of cumulative or lim-
ited voting. Admittedly, I have not considered the viability of such
theories as they apply to local governance in a setting such as New
York City. Arguments both for and against the use of these alterna-
tive schemes should also be addressed in this regard, but I leave that
for another time.
Ultimately, the focus needs to be on fundamental values and the
87. Instead, the Justice Department viewed the commission's choice in District 21 as
evidence of intentional discrimination against Latino voters. Objection Letter from John
Dunne, supra note 23, at 3. In response to this criticism, the commission removed the
black population from the district, raising the Latino population to 55.2%. Letter from
Victor A. Kovner, Corporation Counsel, to Richard Jerome, Esq., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
at 7 (July 25, 1991).
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empowerment of voters. This aim involves more than simply sprin-
kling a greater minority presence on the city council, although such
presence has some value. Unless a particular community's needs are
assessed and addressed, however, only limited change in the quality of
representation and in the amount of voter participation will occur.
Methods of empowerment and society's views of electoral opportu-
nity should not be tied to once-appropriate systems of remedying dis-
crimination that now limit the advancement of minority
empowerment and governmental accountability. Rather than looking
back, we need to look forward by exploring new ideas and concepts of
fairness and real representation. Now that the right to cast an equally
weighted vote has been secured, we need to ensure that the right to
vote be extended into the right to have one's vote yield as much influ-
ence as another's. Future charter revision commissions must expand
their conceptions about the range of possibilities that can result in
true empowerment.
